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Abstract. Due to the increasing dependency of critical infrastructure on syn-
chronized clocks, network time synchronization protocols have become an at-
tractive target for attackers. We identify data origin authentication as the key se-
curity objective and suggest to employ recently proposed high-performance dig-
ital signature schemes (Ed25519 and MQQ-SIG)) as foundation of a novel set of
security measures to secure multicast time synchronization. We conduct experi-
ments to verify the computational and communication efficiency for using these
signatures in the standard time synchronization protocols NTP and PTP. We pro-
pose additional security measures to prevent replay attacks and to mitigate delay
attacks. Our proposed solutions cover 1-step mode for NTP and PTP and we ex-
tend our security measures specifically to 2-step mode (PTP) and show that they
have no impact on time synchronization’s precision.
1 Introduction
Time synchronization protocols have become an essential building block of various ap-
plications. The deployment of time synchronization for controlling system clocks of
critical infrastructures, such as telecommunication, industrial automation, avionics, or
energy distribution raises awareness with respect to the security of time synchronization
protocols. Attacks on time synchronization can originate faulty sensor reports, endanger
control decisions, and adversely affect the overall functionality of applications depend-
ing on it. For this reason, time synchronization protocols have to be secured whenever
they are used outside of fully protected network environments.
In this paper, we abstract the multicast time synchronization scenario from any spe-
cific implementation such as the Network Time Protocol (NTP) or the Precision Time
Protocol (PTP). In multicast communication a sender periodically sends time synchro-
nization messages that can be received by multiple receivers. In contrast to unicast
communication, time synchronization messages are not sent to receivers individually in
multicast communication. Instead, the sender sends each time synchronization message
only once, and the message is replicated by the communication network along distinct
paths whenever needed. In this way, multicast communication is more efficient when
handling multiple receivers, because the load on the sender is reduced and the number
of copies that traverse a network is minimized. In NTP [1], broadcast1 communication
1 Broadcast communication can be seen as a special case of multicast communication where
messages are sent to the entire group of receivers.
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is primarily used for more efficient communication because the increasing use of net-
work time synchronization results in additional load on time senders and networks. In
PTP [2], on the other hand, multicast communication is inherently integrated into the
protocol.
While unicast communication can be appropriately secured, the two most widely
used time synchronization protocols, NTP and PTP, do not protect multicast time syn-
chronization messages adequately, leaving applications vulnerable to attacks. Since no
general solution exists as of now, securing multicast time synchronization remains a
challenging open problem that requires significant attention [3]. In this paper, our aim
is to maintain both security as well as the lowest possible degradation of time synchro-
nization’s accuracy.
Contributions
1. We identify data origin authentication as the key security objective in multicast
time synchronization and suggest recently proposed high-performance signature
schemes (Ed25519 and MQQ-SIG)) to secure multicast time synchronization against
substitution and impersonation attacks.
2. We propose an additional set of security measures including sequence numbers and
session keys to prevent replay attacks, as well as a novel method to mitigate delay
attacks, which consists of a secure delay measurement procedure, dynamic off-
set correction limitation, and a receiver-specific delay measurement interval based
on one-way network delays and clock drift. We furthermore extend the security
measures to 2-step mode in PTP, which additionally entails random numbers and a
hash function to link SYNC and FOLLOWUP messages so that security is provided
without requiring the SYNC message to be signed.
3. We conduct a security analysis, which shows that the proposed security measures
entirely prevent substitution attacks, pre-play attacks, and replay attacks, while de-
lay attacks are mitigated. For delay attacks, we give upper bounds on the delays
that can be introduced maliciously by an adversary.
4. We conducted performance measurements and show that using the proposed high-
speed signature has only low impact on the precision in 1-step mode (28 µs or
75 µs) and, furthermore, introduce only very low communication overhead (32 B
or 64 B plus the size of the sequence number) per message. In 2-step mode, our
security measures have practically no impact on time synchronization’s precision.
2 Background
Due to the lack of access control in many communication networks, cryptographic
schemes are required to ensure that receivers can verify that messages have been, in-
deed, sent by the claimed sender. This security property is called data origin authentica-
tion. Data origin authentication directly affects integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation.
In the context of time synchronization, confidentiality is generally of less concern.
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2.1 Data Origin Authentication
Digital signatures provide data origin authentication but the main downside of today’s
digital signature schemes, such as RSA, DSA, and ECDSA, is that they involve high
computational cost and substantial penalty in terms of delay, both in the sender and
in the receiver. Consequently, it is widely believed that digital signatures are roughly
2 to 3 magnitudes slower than Message Authentication Codes (MACs) [4], such that
signing each packet is not a practical solution. In particular, the time that is needed for
signing packets and verifying digital signatures is detrimental to the precision of time
synchronization protocols. We revise this assumption as we investigate the potential of
recently proposed high-performance digital signature schemes as basis for data origin
authentication in multicast time synchronization.
2.2 Time Synchronization
There are basically two distinct phases in time synchronization protocols: time offset
correction and network delay measurement. Time offset correction is conducted at reg-
ular intervals while network delay measurements are conducted irregularly. The specific
intervals depend on the time synchronization protocol and on the system configuration.
Delay measurements are conducted over a unicast connection while time offset correc-
tions are multicast in PTP and optionally broadcast in NTP.
Fig. 1. Time offset correction and delay measure-
ment.
Time offset corrections can ei-
ther be done in a single message (1-
step mode) supported by both NTP
and PTP or with two messages (2-
step mode) supported by PTP. In 2-
step mode, time synchronization is
split into two messages, a SYNC and
a FOLLOWUP message. The SYNC
message is just used as a marker; the
FOLLOWUP message contains the
exact point in time when the SYNC
message was sent. Figure 1 depicts the
(2-step) time offset correction and de-
lay measurement.
Traversing network components
between sender and receiver intro-
duces variable delays. PTP allows network devices to improve the precision of time
synchronization by measuring and communicating to receivers the delay they have in-
troduced to SYNC messages (in the FOLLOWUP message). Such network devices that
actively support the time synchronization protocol are called transparent clocks. Com-
municating the delay that transparent clocks introduced to a particular message requires
these devices to modify the content of the FOLLOWUP message, which poses a seri-
ous challenge in the light of data origin authentication. We solve this challenge by
introducing security measures specific to the 2-step mode so that transparent clocks are
supported.
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3 Threat Model
Henceforth, we assume that receivers already know the (long-term) public key of the
particular sender and can trust that this public key is both valid and correctly bound to
the sender. I.e., we assume that the certified public key has been transmitted initially in
a reliable and authenticated manner.
3.1 Network Model
The overall purpose of time synchronization protocols is to convey time information in
order to compensate for clock variations. We consider communications involving one
sender and a potentially large number of receivers. Messages are delivered from the
sender to each receiver through an unreliable, potentially lossy communication network,
such as the Internet. Furthermore, we assume that neither network devices nor receivers
can be trusted, since the larger the number of devices the higher the probability that at
least one is compromised. Besides that, receivers and network devices might not even
be controlled by the same entity that controls the sender. The network only forwards
packets, it does not provide any security guarantee such as confidentiality, integrity, and
authenticity so that messages may be read, modified, dropped, or injected by entities
other than the intended receivers. This corresponds to the Dolev-Yao threat model [5].
3.2 Adversary Model
We assume that the adversary does not permanently prevent the communication be-
tween sender and receiver; i.e., the receiver will receive most messages. The adversary
has full control over the network and can selectively capture, drop, resend, inject, de-
lay, and alter messages arbitrarily with negligible delay. The computational power of
the adversary is limited but not necessarily bound to that of the sender or the receivers;
i.e., the adversary can use more powerful devices and larger storage. Furthermore, the
adversary can compromise an arbitrary number of receivers and learn all their secrets.
An important aspect of assuming a powerful adversary is that if security properties hold
against such powerful adversary, they also hold against less capable adversaries.
3.3 Attacks
The adversary aims to make receivers adhere to false time values or to degrade the ac-
curacy of the time synchronization. For this purpose, the adversary can conduct various
attacks [6]:
Substitution Attack In a substitution attack [7], the adversary intercepts valid time syn-
chronization messages during transmission and modifies them in such a way that re-
ceivers accept the forged messages as if they had been sent by the original sender. In
this way, false time information can be distributed to receivers.
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Replay Attack An adversary can record time synchronization messages and replay them
without modification at a later time, since successful verification of a message does not
certify the correctness of the message’s send time [4]. In this way, inaccurate informa-
tion can be intentionally provided to receivers.
Pre-play Attack In contrast to replay attacks, the adversary injects messages at an earlier
point in time in pre-play attacks, before the sender has even sent the message. For this
purpose, the adversary needs to be able to predict future messages.
Removal Attack A removal attack results when time synchronization messages are in-
tentionally dropped by the adversary. As previously stated, we assume that the adversary
does not drop most messages because this would then be an issue of availability rather
than authenticity or integrity.
Delay Attack To conduct a message delay attack, an adversary intercepts time syn-
chronization messages and delays these messages artificially for some time before for-
warding them. If the effective delay is calculated maliciously, the clock of the intended
receiver(s) can be manipulated [6]. Since the time synchronization protocol has no in-
formation about the underlying communication infrastructure, symmetric network de-
lay between sender and receiver is assumed; i.e., the one-way delay from sender to
receiver is the same as the delay from receiver to sender. Message delay attacks exploit
this assumption of symmetric delay by maliciously introducing asymmetric delay in
such a way that the receiver synchronizes to an inaccurate time.
Flooding Attack In Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [8], the computational or storage
capacities of receivers are exhausted in order to prevent or delay the reception of mes-
sages. Such DoS attacks can be conducted, for example, by an adversary sending an
excessive number of time synchronization messages to a receiver. Data origin authen-
tication cannot prevent message flooding attacks but it can reduce their impact, as it
can provide means for receivers to distinguish valid from invalid messages (up to some
number of packets per second).
Data origin authentication can not or only partially prevent message flooding and
message removal attacks. Those attacks only degrade precision, however. Henceforth,
we will focus on preventing attacks that could make receivers synchronize to a false
time and therefore could cause serious disturbance of applications that rely on accurate
time: substitution attacks, replay attacks, pre-play attacks, and delay attacks.
4 Security Measures
In this section, we introduce a set of security measures to secure multicast time synchro-
nization. The security these measures provide against the attacks identified in Section 3
will be analyzed in Section 5. We will use the notation in Table 1 on the next page.
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Table 1. Notation
tarr The local arrival time of a message.
tlast The local arrival time of the last (valid) message seen by the receiver.
ρmax The maximum drift of the receiver’s clock relative to that of the sender.
δmax The maximum one-way network delay.
δmin The minimum one-way network delay.
m 2 · (δmax − δmin)
1 3 · (δmax − δmin)
2 4 · (δmax − δmin) + 2 · δmax · ρmax
The specific values for δmin and δmax depend on the type of network (local, private network or public Internet) and
on the quality of service measures in place. If the adversary is assumed to transfer messages with negligible delay, as
done in Section 3, δmin should be set to 0. If δmax is chosen too small, false alarms may be triggered.
4.1 Data Origin Authentication
Data origin authentication is at the heart of the security measures we propose. The eval-
uation in [9] has revealed that most existing data origin authentication schemes suffer
from severe limitations when securing multicast time synchronization. As a solution one
could either improve one of the two schemes, Receiver driven Layered Hash-chaining
(RLH) [10] or Time Valid Hash to Obtain Random Subsets (TV-HORS) [11], or, alter-
natively, try a different approach. We opted for the latter and propose a different data
origin authentication scheme in which every single message is signed independently,
although common perception is that such an approach is impractical due to the fact
that conventional signature schemes are computationally too expensive. In recent years,
however, novel signature schemes have been proposed that offer previously unrivaled
performance. Employing such novel, high-performance signature schemes can mitigate
the negative performance impact of traditional schemes. In Section 6, we evaluate the
computational efficiency and the communication overhead of this approach. We would
like to stress, however, that the additional security measures we propose do not depend
on this specific data origin authentication scheme as any other scheme could be used as
drop-in replacement as long as it provides existential unforgeability2.
4.2 Freshness of Messages
Replay attacks can be prevented in the context of multicast time synchronization by
ensuring that once a message has been received it is not accepted again at a later point
in time; i.e., the freshness of the message is ensured. To this end, a data origin authenti-
cation scheme alone does not suffice because successful verification of a message does
not imply that the message has never been received before. To ensure the freshness of
messages, we suggest that the sender includes a sequence number in each message that
is monotonically increasing; the sequence number starts with zero3 for the first mes-
sage and increases by one with every message. Receivers and the sender need to store
2 Informally, existential unforgeability means that the adversary can forge a signature to any
message of his choice only with negligible probability.
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only one sequence number as state information. For every received message (that has a
valid signature) the receiver checks the freshness of the message by verifying that the
included sequence number is greater than the locally stored one. If this is the case, the
message is accepted and the local state updated accordingly; otherwise, the message is
discarded.
This strict handling of sequence numbers allows for lost messages due to transmis-
sion errors but prevents a message from getting accepted by the receiver if that message
was overtaken by another message during transmission. While this may sound like a
disadvantage at the first glance, it is actually beneficial in the context of time synchro-
nization. Messages that were overtaken in transit entail a larger network delay than other
messages. Since network delay variation has a negative effect on the receiver’s notion
of time, is is beneficial to the precision of time synchronization when those delayed
messages get discarded.
4.3 Session Keys
Since the sequence number is of fixed size, it will overflow eventually. A long-term
attacker could capture all messages and start replaying them as soon as the sequence
number overflows. To prevent such long-term attack, the sender signs a session public
key (with its long-term secret key) as well as the current sequence number and sends
both to the receiver at the start of the communication.
The receiver verifies the correctness with the sender’s long-term public key. Before
the sequence number overflows, the communication is restarted with a fresh session
key-pair, and the sequence number is again reset to zero. This introduction of session
keys, used for only a limited number of messages, provides not only security against
replay attacks by long-term attackers but also reduces the time an adversary has to attack
a specific key-pair. In this way, session keys also reduce the pressure on the employed
data origin authentication scheme.
4.4 Dynamic Time Offset Correction Limitation
NTP limits both offset correction for individual messages as well as offset correction
during a time span to global, fixed values. Those global values, however, only slow
down but cannot bound delay attacks. In PTP, offset correction limitation does not exist
at all so that time offsets can be arbitrary large; i.e., time can be set back or forth by
years via a single message.
We, on the other hand, limit the maximum time offset correction that a receiver
applies to (tarr − tlast) · ρmax. This dynamic time offset correction limitation restricts
the maximum influence that individual time synchronization messages can have on the
receiver’s notion of time. For each message (with a valid signature and a valid sequence
number) the receiver limits the time offset correction to (tarr − tlast) · ρmax.
3 There is no need for a random initial sequence number for two reasons: (1) the sequence
number is part of the time synchronization messages, which is cryptographically signed so that
an adversary cannot modify it unnoticedly. And (2), an adversary cannot even gain information
about the start of the communication from the sequence number since the adversary cannot
know how often the sequence number has overflowed.
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4.5 Receiver-Specific Delay Measurement Interval
In PTP, delay measurements happen at regular, non-specified intervals. In broadcast
NTP, network delay is only measured once in the beginning. To ensure that the time
offset between sender and receiver cannot be changed arbitrarily between two consec-
utive delay measurements, we use a receiver-specific delay measurement interval of
m
ρmax
. As we will show in Section 5.4, this receiver-specific delay interval together with
dynamic time offset correction limitation and secure delay measurement is sufficient to
bound delay attacks.
4.6 Secure Delay Measurement Procedure
We propose a secure delay measurement procedure, in which a single delay measure-
ment consists of two authenticated unicast messages: (1) a request from a receiver to
the sender and (2) a response from the sender to the receiver. To ensure that the delay
measurement is not artificially delayed, the receiver includes a timestamp in the delay
request to the sender. Furthermore, the receiver waits at most 2·δmax for the sender’s re-
sponse. When the delay request arrives at the sender, the sender checks if the difference
of the included timestamp and the sender’s local clock is in the interval [δmin, δmax]. If
it is not, the sender sends an error message to the receiver because of a potential delay
attack4. Otherwise, the observed delay is so small that the sender cannot distinguish
it from network delay variation. Therefore, the sender answers with a delay response
message to the receiver that includes the timestamp of the sender. The receiver now
conducts the same check (observed time difference within [δmin, δmax]). These checks
ensure that the delay measurements themselves have not been artificially delayed more
than the maximum network delay variation.
In the delay response, the sender furthermore includes the current sequence number
as well as an identifier of its session’s public key. The receiver updates its sequence
number state to the number entailed in the delay response message and sets tlast to
the time of the delay measurement. Furthermore, the receiver checks that the session
public key identifier matches the session public key (if it does not match, the client
needs to restart the communication). In this way, the transition to a new session can be
prevented maliciously at most for one delay measurement interval (plus the timeout)
until the receiver notices. For this reason, an adversary cannot get more time to attack
an old key.
5 Security Analysis
We assume that the adversary is in a privileged network position and conducts various,
potentially severe attacks (as described in Section 3). We furthermore assume that the
adversary does not know the secret key of the sender but he may know the sender’s
4 At the very first delay measurement, the receiver may ignore the sender’s error message and
just set its local time to the timestamp in the error message, as sender and receiver may not yet
be synchronized within a precision of ≤ m.
8
public key as he can compromise any number of receivers. With respect to the data
origin authentication scheme, we assume that it provides existential unforgeability.
In this section we argue that an adversary cannot make a receiver adhere to false
time information by subsitution attacks, impersonation attacks, or replay attacks when
the receiver receives time synchronization messages from a honest sender and both,
receiver and sender, employ the previously outlined security measures. Furthermore,
we will show that the maximum impact of delay attacks is very limited and can be
bound.
5.1 Substitution attack
In a substitution attack, the adversary first intercepts messages including the corre-
sponding authentication information. Eventually, the adversary substitutes parts of an
intercepted message such that the receiver believes that the modified message originated
from the sender.
We argue that a substitution attack can only be conducted successfully when break-
ing the data origin authentication scheme. In a substitution attack, we distinguish two
cases: (1) The adversary modifies the message in such a way that the resulting message
is identical to a message the adversary has intercepted. For the intercepted message,
the adversary also intercepted the corresponding, valid signature. However, this case is
equivalent to either a replay attack or to a delay attack, depending on whether or not the
adversary dropped the original message. The security of the security measures against
replay attacks as well as against delay attacks is analyzed separately later. (2) The ad-
versary modifies the message in such a way that it is new. In order to make a receiver
accept the new message, the adversary needs to provide valid authentication information
(under the sender’s public key).If the adversary can generate valid authentication infor-
mation with non-negligible probability he can also efficiently forge signatures, which
contradicts existential unforgeability provided by the data origin authentication scheme.
5.2 Pre-play Attack
In order to get a pre-played message accepted by the receiver, the adversary needs to
generate a valid signature. Again, if the adversary can do that efficiently he can also
break the existential unforgeability of the underlying data origin authentication scheme.
5.3 Replay Attack
In a replay attack, the adversary injects a message that was intercepted before and that
included valid authentication information provided by the sender. We argue that a re-
ceiver that employs our security measures discards replayed messages unless the ad-
versary breaks the underlying data origin authentication scheme. To this end, we dis-
tinguish two cases: (1) The adversary prevented the original message from reaching the
receiver, which is equivalent to a delay attack where the adversary holds a message for
some time and later forwards it to the receiver. Delay attacks, specifically, are analyzed
later. (2) The adversary did not prevent the original message from reaching the receiver.
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Since the receiver received the original message, the receiver has updated its sequence
number state with the sequence number from the received message. If no other message
reached the receiver in the meantime, the sequence number in the replayed message is
identical to the receiver’s local state. For this reason, the receiver will discard the re-
played message.5 When other messages have reached the receiver in the meantime, we
need to distinguish two sub-cases: (2a) The maximum sequence number value was not
reached. In this case, the sequence number in the replayed message is smaller than the
receiver’s local state, and the receiver will therefore discard the replayed message.5 (2b)
The maximum sequence number value was reached. In this case, the sequence number
of the replayed message may actually be greater than the last seen sequence number
stored locally by the receiver at that time because the sequence number was reset to
zero when the new session was started. The authentication information of the replayed
message, however, is not valid anymore since the sender has switched to a new key-pair
for the new session. The adversary, therefore, needs to generate authentication infor-
mation that is valid under the new key-pair in order to make the receiver accept the
message. This is equivalent to an impersonation attack, however, which was analyzed
previously.
5.4 Delay Attack
In a delay attack, the adversary intercepts a message, delays it for some time, and for-
wards it later to the receiver. The goal of the delay attack is to influence the receiver’s
notion of time maliciously. In contrast to the other attacks, message delay attacks cannot
be prevented entirely. We will show, however, that our security measures can mitigate
delay attacks by providing two upper bounds to the time offset between sender and
receiver: (1) the maximum time offset so that a delay attack can go unnoticed 1, and
(2) the maximum time offset before the receiver does notice the delay attack 2. Before
proving the upper bounds 1 and 2 we first establish two building blocks: (1) that the
maximum time offset between sender and receiver that is unnoticed at a delay measure-
ment equals m and (2) that the maximum time offset correction that can be applied
between two consecutive delay measurements equals m as well. Figure 2 on the facing
page depicts the bounds and the building blocks.
Let’s assume that the time offset between sender and receiver is > m at a delay
measurement interval. According to the security measures, the receiver sends a delay
measurement request to the sender that includes the timestamp of the receiver. We dis-
tinguish two cases: (1a) The adversary drops the receiver’s delay measurement request.
After waiting for the server’s response for the timeout period 2 · δmax , however, the
receiver notices the delay attack. (1b) The adversary does not drop the receiver’s delay
measurement request so that it arrives at the sender. The sender compares the receiver’s
time entailed in the delay measurement request to the sender’s local time and notices
that the time difference is> m. For this reason, the sender will return an error message
back to the receiver. The adversary can now either drop the sender’s response, which
is equally noticed by the receiver after the timeout, or the adversary does not drop the
5 Unless the adversary increased the sequence number artificially which is equivalent to a sub-
stitution attack.
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Fig. 2. Building blocks of delay bounds.
sender’s error message and the receiver notices the attack from the error message. For
this reason, the time offset at a delay measurement will be noticed when > m and
therefore must be at ≤ m to go unnoticed.
(2) According to the newly introduced dynamic time offset correction limitation, the
maximum time offset correction applied equals (tarr − tlast) · ρmax. Since the delay
measurement interval is fixed (per receiver) and tlast is set by the receiver at every
delay measurement, the maximum difference tarr−tlast equals one delay measurement
interval mρmax . For this reason, the maximum time offset correction that can be applied
between two consecutive delay measurements is mρmax · ρmax = m.
Based on the two building blocks, we now show that the maximum time offset that
goes unnoticed equals 1. Let’s assume that the time offset at a delay measurement is
m (the greatest value that goes unnoticed, as just shown before). If the adversary wants
to get the delay attack to go unnoticed at the subsequent delay measurement, the delay
attack must be conducted and its effects reverted within the same delay measurement in-
terval so that the time offset between sender and receiver is again≤ m at the next delay
measurement. The time required to conduct the delay attack is equivalent to the time re-
quired to revert its effects because of the dynamic time offset correction limitation. If the
effects of the adversary’s attack exceeds m at the subsequent delay measurement, the
receiver will notice (see Figure 2). For this reason, the adversary needs to make sure that
additionally delay introduced between the two delay measurements is reverted by the
next delay measurement. Therefore, the maximum effect of a delay attack during a delay
measurement interval equals m2 = δmax−δmin, and the upper bound of the time offset
that will go unnoticed therefore equals m + δmax − δmin = 3 · (δmax − δmin) = 1.
Finally, we can show that the upper bound of the time offset at the point in time when
the receiver notices the delay attack equals 2. We already know that the maximum time
offset at a delay measurement equals m and the maximum time offset correction that
can be applied during a delay measurement interval equals m as well. At the subsequent
delay measurement, the receiver waits for 2 · δmax for the sender’s delay reply to the
receiver’s request. During that time the receiver’s clock may drift at most 2·δmax ·ρmax.
For this reason, the upper bound of the time offset at the point in time when the receiver
notices the delay attack equals m + m + 2 · δmax · ρmax = 2.
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6 Computational and Communication Efficiency
Computational efficiency is of crucial importance for high-precision time synchroniza-
tion, and communication efficiency is generally important as bandwidth is a worthy
resource. To evaluate our approach on data origin authentication, we test the computa-
tional and communication efficiency of two different, high-performance digital signa-
ture schemes in the context of time synchronization (both with a conjectured security
of 128 bit): Ed25519 [12], an elliptic-curve signature scheme “carefully engineered at
several levels of design and implementation to achieve very high speed without compro-
mising security” [12], and MQQ-SIG [13], a signature scheme based on multivariate-
quadratic quasigroups. Both schemes are designed to provide extremely fast signing
and verification operations.
6.1 Measurement Setup
Fig. 3. Measurement setup.
To test whether our proposed solution
actually delivers the expected perfor-
mance in practice we conducted experi-
mental measurements using the measure-
ment setup depicted in Figure 3. We set
up a stratum 1 NTP server that is syn-
chronized to Coordinated Universal Time
(UTC) through a dedicated Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) Pulse per Second
(PPS) hardware clock. The server broad-
casts time synchronization messages to
the local network every 8 seconds, which
is the shortest interval possible without
making changes to NTP‘s source code.
On the other end runs an NTP client that synchronizes its clock to the NTP server‘s
broadcast time. To measure the time synchronization delay, the NTP client can access
the same GPS PPS timing signal as the server, but is configured to synchronize just to
the NTP server and to explicitly ignore the GPS clock in its NTP synchronization al-
gorithm. I.e., the client just logs the accurate GPS clock values to support later assess-
ment of the influence that data origin authentication has onto time synchronization’s
precision. Both end systems, NTP server and NTP client, use identical time synchro-
nization hardware for synchronization and timestamping. Between the server and the
client are two network bridges named Signer and Verifier. Signer waits for NTP time
synchronization packets and signs the payload using a high-performance digital signa-
ture scheme. Verifier looks for signed NTP time synchronization packets, verifies the
signature, and removes it thereafter. At the client, normal, unmodified NTP messages
arrive. The described setup allows running unmodified NTP code. Admittedly, signing
messages and verifying signatures takes time so that messages arrive delayed to client.
The GPS synchronized reference clock at the client allows to quantify this delay and
enables measuring the influence on the client’s clock synchronization algorithm.
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6.2 Measurement Results
The main goal of the measurements was to quantify the amount of delay that is in-
troduced to the clock synchronization algorithm when signing and verifying broadcast
NTP time synchronization messages. We assumed the introduced delay to be very small
due to the use of high-performance signature schemes. To separate the delay introduced
by our measurement setup from the delay introduced by signing and verifying mes-
sages, we conducted four measurements. Each measurement was run for more than 24
hours.
First, we configured Signer and Verifier as plain network bridges that only for-
warded packets. In this scenario, we observed a median delay of 241 µs. This is the
influence that Ethernet plus two bridges have on NTP’s precision (when the network
delay is not compensated). Then, Signer and Verifier not only forwarded packets but
first copied the packets to user-space, where they were parsed (but not signed!). This
introduced a median delay of 336 µs, which includes the delay for Ethernet as measured
before. We, therefore, conclude that copying the packets to user-space and parsing them
(two times) introduces around 94 µs of additional delay. The last two measurements
finally quantify the amount of delay that is introduced in NTP’s clock synchroniza-
tion algorithm by signing and verifying each packet individually using the signature
schemes in question: Ed25519 and MQQ-SIG. For Ed25519, we observed a median
delay of 411 µs, which means that about 75 µs were spent on signing messages and ver-
ifying signatures. For MQQ-SIG, we observed a median delay of 364 µs. This means
that only about 28 µs were spent on signing messages and verifying signatures. Ta-
ble 2 summarizes the measurement results. We argue that, when implemented within a
time synchronization protocol, the delay introduced by the authentication scheme can
be even further reduced by (a) the sender communicating the minimum time required
to sign a message, and (b) the client subtracting the time it took to verify the signature
of a specific message.
Table 2. Summary of measurement results
Measurement Median Time Offset Standard Deviation Relative Time Offset
Ethernet 241 µs 5.5 µs −94 µs
Ethernet + nfqueue 336 µs 8.7 µs 0 µs
Ethernet + nfqueue + Ed25519 411 µs 8.2 µs 75 µs
Ethernet + nfqueue + MQQ-SIG 364 µs 8.2 µs 28 µs
The communication overhead is very small because of the signature sizes of both
schemes. Again, MQQ-SIG performs better in this regard than Ed25519 (32 B vs. 64 B).
Such small signature sizes mean that the resulting communication overhead of the au-
thentication scheme is only 32 B or 64 B per message. For the overall overhead, the size
of the sequence number as well as the sizes of the public keys have to be included. The
size of the public key is significantly larger for MQQ-SIG than for Ed25519 (32 kB vs.
517 B).
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7 Security Measures Specific to 2-Step Mode
Most of the previously introduced security measures for the 1-step mode can directly
be applied in 2-step mode. But in 2-step mode, there are two messages for time offset
correction, SYNC and FOLLOWUP. To facilitate hardware-timestamping and transpar-
ent clocks as well as to reduce the impact on precision even further, we sign only the
FOLLOWUP message. The sequence number, however, can only ensure that the au-
thentication information in the FOLLOWUP message is fresh – it cannot guarantee that
SYNC and FOLLOWUP messages are related in any way. Since we only sign the FOL-
LOWUP message but not the SYNC message, an adversary could create fake SYNC
messages as the sequence numbers are predictable. Such fake SYNC messages injected
at malicious points in time would make a receiver adhere to false time. To prevent that,
we link the unsigned SYNC message to the corresponding, signed FOLLOWUP mes-
sage. To this end, we introduce the following extension: the sender includes a number
in each SYNC message and includes a hash in the FOLLOWUP message. The hash is
the output of a collision-resistant hash function given the SYNC message concatenated
with the sender’s session public key as input.
The number entailed in each SYNC message must be unpredictable and it also must
not repeat within a session. Randomness provides unpredictability and a large sample
space ensures probabilistic insignificance so that non-repetition can be provided6. For
this reason, the random number must be (significantly) larger than the sequence num-
ber. Otherwise, random numbers have to repeat within a session (pigeon hole principle),
which would facilitate a simple replay attack. The SYNC message makes the hash im-
plicitly include the number, which is essential for establishing a link between SYNC
and FOLLOWUP message. By adding the sender’s session public key, the receiver can
verify that the SYNC message actually belongs to the current session (and has not been
replayed from a previous session) because each session uses a new public key. Other-
wise, an adversary could just collect SYNC messages with different numbers across
sessions and replay them at a later point in time.
The receiver can immediately discard SYNC messages that have a smaller sequence
number than the last seen sequence number. But the receiver must not update its local
state until a valid FOLLOWUP messages was received. When the receiver receives
a SYNC message that is already in the receiver’s buffer, the newly received SYNC
message can also be discarded (as it is identical). When receiving a FOLLOWUP mes-
sage, the receiver first checks the validity of the included signature. Then, the receiver
checks whether the the hash of the SYNC message concatenated with the session pub-
lic key is identical to the hash included in the FOLLOWUP message. The receiver
also checks that the sequence number of the SYNC message is exactly one below the
FOLLOWUP’s sequence number. If this is the case, the SYNC message and also the
FOLLOWUP message are accepted as valid (for this session); otherwise, they are dis-
carded. The receiver clears its list of buffered SYNC messages after receiving a (valid)
FOLLOWUP message, after a delay measurement, and when a new session is started.
6 Coincidences of the birthday paradox can be taken into account by the counter or the OFB
mode of a block cipher [14].
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Basically, FOLLOWUP messages, delay measurements, and sessions serve as timeout
periods for received SYNC messages.
Transparent Clocks and Hardware-Timestamping
As pointed out earlier, transparent clocks and hardware-timestamping are serious secu-
rity challenges. With the 2-step specific security measures, however, hardware-timestamping
of SYNC messages is facilitated as the SYNC messages do not need to be cryptograph-
ically signed. Furthermore, we can support transparent clocks which can append the
delay they introduced to the original FOLLOWUP message and sign the resulting mes-
sage themselves. We cannot guarantee, however, that a specific transparent clock is on
the path from sender to receiver (an adversary could just have compromised the trans-
parent clock and use its secret key to add artificial delay). Nevertheless, this kind of
attack can be seen as a special case of a delay attack which will be analyzed later.
8 Security Analysis for 2-Step Mode
In Section 5, we analyzed the security our measures provide against every severe at-
tack in 1-step mode. In this section, we will analyze the security of the 2-step specific
security measures.
8.1 Substitution attack
We have already shown that the signed message is secure against substitution attacks
in 1-step mode and, for this reason, conclude that the signed FOLLOWUP message
is equally secure in 2-step mode. We need to show, however, that splitting the time
synchronization message into a signed FOLLOWUP and an unsigned SYNC message
does not increase the adversary’s success probability.
The adversary can substitute parts of the SYNC message and the receiver will still
accept the message temporarily, as it is not signed and the receiver cannot verify the
authenticity of the message at that point. However, before the arrival time of the SYNC
message is used for time offset correction, the receiver waits for the FOLLOWUP mes-
sage as it contains the send time of the SYNC message. If the hash in the FOLLOWUP
message does not match the hash of the SYNC message concatenated with the sender’s
session public key or if the sequence number of the SYNC message is not exactly one
below that of the FOLLOWUP message, the receiver will discard the SYNC message.
Now, we distinguish two cases: (1) the new SYNC message that resulted from replac-
ing parts of an old message is identical to a message that the adversary has captured
before. This case is equivalent to a replay attack or a delay attack, both of which will be
analyzed later. (2) The message is new in a sense that the adversary has not seen it be-
fore. Then, the adversary needs the hash of the new, substituted message (concatenated
with the session public key) to match the hash in the signed FOLLOWUP message. If
the adversary can do that efficiently, however, he can also break the collision resistance
of the hash function. If, on the other hand, the adversary decides to wait for a FOL-
LOWUP message that matches the new random number and drops all other messages
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meanwhile, the receiver will discard the SYNC message because the sequence num-
ber will not match. The probability that the random number in a specific FOLLOWUP
message matches equals 1n−l with n the size of the sample space and l the number of
random numbers that were already used by the sender in this session. The probability is
negligible small when n is chosen sufficiently large. Besides, even if the attack should
be successful, the impact on the receiver’s notion of time would be very low because of
the dynamic offset correction limitation.
8.2 Pre-play Attack
In a pre-play attack, the adversary aims to make injected messages appear as if it were
sent by the legitimate sender. Since we have already shown that pre-play attacks can be
prevented in 1-step mode, which is equivalent to the FOLLOWUP message in 2-step
mode, we now focus on SYNC messages.
The adversary can try to guess the random number and inject a SYNC message
with the guessed random number and a specific sequence number at an earlier point
in time, drop all other SYNC and FOLLOWUP messages in the meantime, and wait
for the sender to send the FOLLOWUP message with that sequence number, which is
equivalent to a substitution attack described above. In a pre-play attack, the adversary
can increase his chances, however, by sending a large number of SYNC messages with
different random numbers, since the adversary’s attempts do not need to be signed.
The success probability is relative to the number of messages the adversary can inject,
compared to the size of the sample space (and the number of random numbers already
used by the sender in this session). However, the adversary is limited twofold: 1) by
the number of messages the adversary can inject and 2) by the maximum number of
SYNC messages that the receiver can buffer. If the receiver’s buffer is full and it cannot
accept any more (valid) SYNC message, it is a DoS attack but not a severe attack in
which the receiver’s notion of time is maliciously manipulated. Furthermore, even if
the adversary succeeds, the maximum impact of the attack is limited by the dynamic
time offset correction limitation.
For this reason, the 2-step security mode opens another possibility for an adver-
sary to conduct an attack but such pre-play attack requires more resources and has a
lower success probability than a delay attack while it cannot have greater impact on
the client’s notion of time. For this reason, we are convinced that facilitating hardware-
timestamping and transparent clocks while having no impact on the time synchroniza-
tion’s precision outweigh the slightly increased attack surface.
8.3 Replay Attack
Again, we focus only on SYNC messages as replayed FOLLOWUP messages are
equivalent to the 1-step scenario. In a replay attack, we distinguish two cases: (1) the
original message is prevented from reaching the receiver which is equivalent to a de-
lay attack and will be analyzed later, and (2) the receiver receives the original as well
as the replayed SYNC message. If the replayed SYNC message is received before the
corresponding FOLLOWUP message, then the receiver has already stored an identical
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SYNC message and will therefore discard the replayed message. If the replayed mes-
sage is received after the original FOLLOWUP message, the sequence number of the
replayed SYNC message is smaller than the FOLLOWUP’s sequence number and the
replayed SYNC message will therefore be discarded – unless the adversary waits for
a new session when the sequence number fits again. Then, however, the receiver will
accept the replayed message only when the hash in the FOLLOWUP message matches
(note that the hash also includes the sender’s session public key). If an adversary can
construct such matching hash efficiently, he can also break the collision-resistance of
the hash function. For this reason, replay attacks can prevented entirely - also in 2-step
mode.
8.4 Delay Attack
We have shown that delay attacks can be bound in 1-step mode by a combination of
dynamic time offset limitation, a receiver-specific delay measurement interval, and an
improved delay measurement procedure. To evaluate whether an adversary can benefit
from delaying SYNC or FOLLOWUP messages in the 2-step mode, we distinguish
two scenarios: (1) only the SYNC message is delayed, and (2) only the FOLLOWUP
message is delayed.
(1) If the delayed SYNC message arrives after the corresponding FOLLOWUP
message, the delayed SYNC message will be discarded by the receiver because the
message’s sequence number is smaller than the receiver’s local state updated from the
FOLLOWUP message. If the delayed SYNC message arrives before the corresponding
FOLLOWUP message, the receiver will accept the delayed SYNC message as valid and
set its time according to the (malicious) delay. This is equivalent to the delay attack in
1-step mode and therefore equally bound.
(2) If the FOLLOWUP message is maliciously delayed and there is another FOL-
LOWUP message or a delay measurement before the delayed FOLLOWUP message,
the delayed message will be discarded by the receiver because its sequence number is
too small. Therefore, the adversary can delay the FOLLOWUP message only slightly.
But there is no benefit for the adversary by delaying the FOLLOWUP message slightly
as the FOLLOWUP message contains only time information but its timing has no in-
fluence; delaying the FOLLOWUP message only delays the point in time when the
receiver will apply the time offset correction but it cannot influence the time offset cor-
rection itself.
9 Related Work
PTP includes an experimental security extension, Annex K [2], which provides mes-
sage integrity and replay protection. Annex K, however, is based on symmetric-key
cryptography and, therefore, cannot provide data origin authentication. Furthermore,
several flaws were discovered and it was never properly formalized [20, 21]. NTP, on
the other hand, incorporates two integrated security mechanisms to provide authenticity
and integrity: (1) symmetric [1] and (2) Autokey [22]. Both mechanisms cannot provide
data origin authentication. Furthermore, the use of Autokey is strongly discouraged as
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Table 3. Comparison of SecureTime to related work
Name Data Origin
Authentication
NTP
Support
PTP
Support
Substitution
Prevention
Pre-play
Prevention
Replay
Prevention
Delay
Mitigation
NTS [15, 16, 17] 3 3 7 3 3 3 7
PTP extension [18, 19] 3 7 3 3 7 3 7
SecureTime 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Supported (3), or not supported (7).
severe security weaknesses of the algorithm have been discovered [23, 24]. As poten-
tial successors of Autokey another proposal is discussed at the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF): Network Time Security (NTS) [15, 16, 17]. NTS consist of a set of
IETF drafts that aim at providing authenticity and integrity for unicast and broadcast
time synchronization protocols. By now, NTS is only specified for NTP. For data ori-
gin authentication, NTS employs Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication
(TESLA) [25, 26, 27] which was shown to be susceptible to message delay attacks in
the context of time synchronization [9]. While NTS prevents substitution attacks and
pre-play attacks, delay attacks were not addressed specifically. Replay protection is re-
alized with TESLA but it requires only one message to be sent per time interval which
is rather inefficient and may facilitate a simple DoS attack on the receivers’ buffers.
A recently suggested security extension to PTP [18, 19] aims to secure the 2-steps
of PTP. It provides data origin authentication by employing Ed25519, prevents substitu-
tion attacks, and provides replay protection with sequence numbers. However, since the
authors use several threat models and did not conduct a comprehensive security analy-
sis, their sequence number window approach facilitates DoS attacks were an adversary
just needs to inject SYNC messages with the highest acceptable sequence number. In
this way, no other, valid messages will be accepted by the receiver anymore. Further-
more, their proposal is susceptible to pre-play attacks because sequence numbers are
predictable and there is no other link between SYNC and FOLLOWUP messages other
than the predictable sequence numbers. In this way, an adversary can make receivers
adhere to a false time by pre-playing SYNC messages. Delay attacks are also not con-
sidered.
10 Conclusion
A security measure integrated into time synchronization protocols is required in order
to achieve high-precision time synchronization. First, we conducted a comprehensive
threat analysis of time synchronization protocols in the context of multicast communi-
cation. To prevent the attacks identified in the threat analysis, we suggest a novel set of
security measures to secure multicast time synchronization. At the heart of the security
measures is a data origin authentication scheme based on high-performance digital sig-
nature schemes (Ed25519 or MQQ-SIG). The security measures, furthermore, entail a
set of means specific to time synchronization: sequence number and session keys to pre-
vent replay attacks as well as a novel set of countermeasures to mitigate delay attacks
consisting of a secured delay measurement procedure, dynamic offset correction lim-
itation, and a receiver-specific delay measurement interval based on one-way network
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delays and clock drift. We analyzed the security that our security measures provide
against every severe attack; substitution attacks, pre-play attacks, and replay attacks are
prevented entirely, while delay attacks are mitigated. For delay attacks, we provide up-
per bounds on the delays that can be introduced maliciously. Additionally, we conducted
experimental measurements that show that the security measures we suggest achieve the
desired computational and communication efficiency in 1-step mode. We then extended
our security measures to support the 2-step mode by requiring only the FOLLOWUP
message to be signed and, in this way, support both hardware-timestamping and trans-
parent clocks. These security measures specific to the 2-step mode have practically no
impact on the precision of time synchronization.
We are confident that the security measures we suggest in this paper, provide a
significant step forward to secure multicast time synchronization.
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